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While Iranian foreign policy making since the 1979 revolution has been erratic 
and even hostile to the interests of the United States, it has been anything blit irrational 
and unintelligible. This thesis argues that Iranian foreign policy making is not enigmatic 
but rather can be understood in a systematic and rational manner. The key to 
understanding Iranian foreign policy making is the notion of factional politics in an 
unconsolidated polity. Put briefly, Iran has lacked a consistent and decisive center of 
power, leaving foreign policy-making in the hands of various elite factions. The 
seemingly erratic nature of Iran's actions is explained by noting which faction is behind 
various policies. Seemingly self-defeating foreign policies have often been designed for 
domestic political advantage. Foreign policy, like domestic policy, is a tool for advantage 
in Iran's factional power struggle--conclusions directly at odds with Neo-Realist theory. 
President Khatami's pursuit of liberalization and rapprochement with the US has 
highlighted the factional component of Iranian policy making. Understanding Iranian 
,policy in this manner leads to a logical conclusion for US policy makers: Khatami's 
overtures are genuine and strategic, not only because they will help Iran but also because 
they will help Khatami remain in power. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1979 Islamic Revoluti9n, Iran has conducted a foreign policy best 
known in the West for its frequent hostility and contradicti~n. Numerous examples of . 
support for terrorist acts abroad, attempts to destabilize regional governments and to 
spread its example of revolutionary rebirth have epitomized Iranian diplomacy. Iran's 
reward for non-traditional diplomacy has been frequent and long-term ostracization from 
former allies, neighbors, business partners, and lenders. An additional result of this has 
often included disastrous domestic consequences. Nevertheless, in spite of the human 
losses from war, severe economic impact from lost trade and investment, and regional 
ostracism, Iran has continued to back up rhetoric with actions. 
As a result of such Iranian activity, many Americans, including policy makers, 
have considereq Iran an enigma. After all, h~w could anyone hope to understand the 
motivation of a government that is frequently seen to engage in foreign policies directly 
contradicting the rules of the international system and arguably even their own national 
interests? This inability to understand Iranian policies appears to have encouraged a 
perception that it is simply. impossible to. account for foreign policy actions of Islamic 
fundamentalist states such as Iran. 
Such intellectual surrender becomes more acute when policy makers fall into the 
"Orientalist trap." Images of back turbaned ayatollahs, crowds chanting "marg bar 
Amreka" (death to America), and tales of medieval Islamic punishments encourage a 
belief that Westerners are incapable of understanding the "unique" Islamic 
fundamentalist imperatives presumably centr~ to all Iranian motivations. 
Of the big four rogues-Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea-Iran has been 
viewed with most suspicion. Iraq and Libya are mere dictatorships, North 
Korea a petty dynasty and communist holdout. These countries the United 
States can understand. But Iran is more troublesome-it is.an Islamic 
fundamentalist state, warlike and irrational. l 
My thesis challenges this prevailing "Orientalist" mindset, common among many 
US policy makers, that the highly publicized "radical" foreign policies of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran are primarily attributable to the nature of some unitary Islamic 
fundamentalist ideology. This thesis will argue Iran's "radical" foreign policy is not as 
some would believe, a phenomenon directly attributable to the radical nature. of Iran's 
fundamentalist regime. The key to understanding Iranian foreign policy making is the 
notion of factional politics in an unconsolidated polity. Put briefly, Iran has lacked a 
consistent and decisive center of power, leaving foreign policy making in the hands of 
. I 
various elite factions. The seemingly erratic nature of Iran's foreign policy is explained 
by noting which faction is behind various policies. 
The 1997 election· of President Khatami has taken this political game to a new 
level. Khatami' s pursuit of liberalization and rapprochement with the US has highlighted 
the factional component of policy making in Iran. These policies, also, come at a critical . 
juncture in Iranian history. Understanding Iranian foreign policy in this manner leads to 
a logical conclusion for US policy makers: Khatami's overtures are genuine and 
strategic, not only because they will help Iran move forward but also because they will 
help Khatami remain in power. 
J Tarek Masouod, "Misreading Iran," Current History, Vol. 97, January 1998, p. 16. 
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This thesis will analyze Iran's domestic factionalized political environment since 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as well as the effect factionalism has had on Iranian foreign 
policy. To accomplish this analysis, several analytical tools of comparative foreign 
policy theory are applied to explain the origins and reasons for Iran's often-inconsistent 
foreign policies. These analytical tools are used to help narrow the range of variables 
which need to be considered in examining the motives behind various foreign policy 
actions. 
However, the value of studying Iranian foreign policy using these analytical tools 
is not just worthwhile because it clarifies events of the past. Their true value is in their 
potential for future application. Specifically, if the predominant goals of the competing 
factions within Iran can be properly identified, US policy makers may be able to more 
accurately forecast future actions and pian for appropriate responses. 
3 
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II. REGIME FACTIONAISM AND FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION 
The intricacies of international relations and foreign policy have been the focus of . 
a wide range of research and scholarship. Many case studies have focused on 
understanding the motivation of individual states at various significant periods in their 
history. Within this type of research, two main historical schools of thought exist. The 
first school, supported by state-level theorists, contends that domestic politics are most 
responsible for influencing a state's foreign policy formulation. In contrast, the second . 
school, called neo-realists, discounts domestic factors as decisive to foreign policy 
outcomes. They argue that it is the structure of the international system which has the 
most influence on a state's foreign policy formulation and execution. Because I intend to 
prove the importance of domestic factioI,lalism on Iranian foreign policy, I will focus on 
the principles associated with state-level theory.2 
Using America as an example, one can observe the influence domestic politics 
and opposition groups have had on foreign policy formulation. Of course, this is not 
. surprising given the fact that open political sy~tems, such as ours, are expected to be . 
accountable and accommodate challenges from dom~stic opposition and special interest 
groups. After all, open political systems have regular competitive electoral contests, 
legalized political parties, a high degree of toleration for autonomous political groups, 
2 The theory that Iranian foreign policy is influe~ced heavily by domestic factional politics is directly at 
odds with the expectations of Neo-Realists. 
5 
and an acceptance of constitutional restraints on government power. 3 However, in 
contrast, closed political systems are thought to be immune from the restrictions of 
accountability and political opposition. When we think of the model of a classic 
authoritarian state we would expect to see an official ideology, a single mass party, a 
system of terroristic policy control, near complete party control of all means of effective 
mass communication, and central control of the entire economy.4 Therefore, within such 
a state as Iran, the presence of an effective challenger would appear to be quite unlikely. 
. . 
However, it is not because significant opposition can and does occur in closed political 
systems. 
Case studies have shown the foreign policies of several authoritarian states, such 
as the Soviet Union and China, have indeed been affected by domestic forces.s While 
these case studies do not identify opposition in the form of political parties or interest 
groups, opposition is frequently found within the ruling regime. These inter-regime 
divisions are often institutionalized when a collective rules authoritarian regimes. In 
these cases a leader may have to share power with a collection of equally powerful, or 
perhaps more powerful, individuals or groups. Therefore, instead of being the single 
powerful executive, the authoritarian leader may simply be "a first among equals." 
3 R. Barry Farrell, "Foreign Policies of Open and Closed Political Systems," in R.B. Farrell (ed.), 
Approaches to Comparative International Politics (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 
168. 
4 C. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger, 1956) who 
are quoted by Joe D. Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign 
Policy," in New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, C. Hermann, C. Kegley, Jr., and J. Rosenau (ed.) 
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 341. 
5 See studies by Alexander Dallin, "The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy," in S. Bialer (ed.), The 
Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981) and T. Gottlieb, Chinese 
Foreign Policy Factionalism After the Cultural Revolution, R-1901-NA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 
1977). 
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Additionally, there is no indication that authoritarian regimes founded on ideological 
principles are more immune from these sorts of internal divisions. While ideology may 
be useful for articulating a strategic vision, it is usually elastic and can be stretched to 
accommodate widely differing perspectives. 
A. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INTER-REGIME OPPOSITION 
Given the ability for opposition to affect the foreign policy of authoritarian 
regimes, it is important to understand the factors which are most responsible. Two of the 
most important factors are the levels of vulnerability and factionalism present within the 
regime. 
1. Fragmentation and Vulnerability 
Fragmentation refers to the degree to which a single leader is unable to effectively .. 
. ( ..... 
dominate the state's political environment.6 The leader's ability to dominate is degraded 
if his regime suffers from internal political divisions, whether they are competing 
political groups, particular individuals, or associated institutions and bureaucracies. 
Regime vulnerability differs from fragmentation in that it focuses on the strengt.h of the 
regime relative' to the broad~r political environment of the state.7 For example, what is 
the likelihood that the leader will be removed from office? 
The degre~ to which fragmentation and vulnerability are present is important 
because they indicate how much flexibility a leader has to make controversial foreign 
6 Joe D. Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," in New 
Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, C. Hermann et al (ed.) (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 344. 
7 Ibid., p. 346. 
7 
policy decisions. A leader within a fragmented and vulnerable regime will avoid creating 
controversies which could provoke public debate.8 Debate could prove costly if it 
alienates key political support groups or calls into questions his suitability for leadership. , 
Leaders in vulnerable positions therefore build alliances by carefully negotiating, 
persuading, and accommodating rival political actors in order to successfully implement 
policy or simply remain in office. Such political ,gymnastics can be extremely difficult 
and can result in ambiguous, contradictory, and inconsistent policies and declarations as 
leaders engage in "horse trading" to meet their broader policy objectives. These 
challenges become even more significant when regimes lack central control over 
government bureaucracies. In these cases various government agencies- seeing a role 
for themselves in the diplomatic relations of their country- may engage in politically 
motivated contradictory policy announcements or actions. Hagan describes the 
diplomatic personality of these regimes.: 
Fragmented and vulnerable regimes are likely to engage in passive or 
quiet behaviors, that is, diplomacy marked by few initiatives, low intensity 
and occasional hostility. In part this passivity stems from the "watering 
down" process inherent in bargaining and compromise when a consensus 
is developed. Perhaps more importantly though, quiet diplomacy stems 
from the imperative that highly constrained governments must avoid 
controversies that could disrupt tenuous public support and 
interfactionallintergroup balances.9 
2. Political Foreign Policy Actors 
Within factional regimes, Hagan has identified four political actors which 
impact foreign policy: (1) divisions within the leadership stemming from personality and 
8 Ibid., p. 349. 
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factional and bureaucratic differences; (2) legislative actors and other governmental 
actors sharing power with the executive; (3) politically active segments of the society in 
the form of bureaucratic and interest groups; and (4) the less structured activity of the 
mass public in the form of public opinion and sometimes widespread civil unrest.10 As I 
will illustrate in later chapters, all of these actors are present and have substantial roles in 
influencing Iran's foreign policy. 
Q. Individual Actors 
The first political actors identified by Hagan can be described'as 
individual actors. These actors are powerful individuals within a regime that, either 
through the power of their individual office or through force of the~r own personality, are 
able to unilaterally enact policy or exert significant influence within government and 
society. Within Iran several individuals and positions' have traditionally possessed such 
power. First among them is the Faqih, Iran's Supreme Spiritual Leader, best represented 
by the former office holder and leader of Iran's revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Although no one in Iran today possesses the virtually unchallengable political power 
Khomeini eventually achieved; several very influential indivi~uals do exist. These 
powerful actors include the current Faqih, Ayatollah Khamenei; Iran's' hugely popular 
President Khatami; the former president and head of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani; 
and the current speaker ofthe Majlis (parliament) Nateq-Nuri. 
9 Ibid., p. 350. 
9 
b. Legislative and Other Government Actors 
The second level of political actors is legislative and other government 
actors who share power with the executive. Iran's bureaucratic government contains a. 
myriad of departments which compose the overall structure of government power; 
however, several departments stand out as the main power brokers within the Islamic 
Republic. Among them are the Expediency Council, Majlis, Justice Ministry, Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). 
All of these organization, to varying degrees, have played direct roles in the execution 
and formulation of foreign policy. 
c. Politically Active Segments of Society 
The third level of political actors can be described as politically active 
segments of society. Within Iranian soCiety these actors are represented by bazaaris 
(Iran's traditional merchant and business class), the Bonyade Mostaza'jaan (Foundations 
of the Oppressed), technocrats, and the growing number of pragmatic and politically 
active clerics. While groups such as these are not typically expected to have the power to 
directly influence foreign policy, the history of the Islamic Republic proves otherwise. 
d. Less Structured Mass Public 
The last level of political actors in Iran are the less structured mass public. 
Although the Islamic Republic has been a state which has lacked political pluralism and 
party organizations, the power and influence of Iran's increasingly disenchanted 
population can not be underestimated. This fact became all the more obvious after the 
\0 Ibid., p. 343. 
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1997 presidential elections in which the candidate, widely regarded as a long shot, 
received a mandate of 69 percent of the popular vote. This event, and other recent 
developments in Iran, point to the increasing influence ordinary Iranian citizens will 
continue to have on the organization and activities of their government, including foreign 
policy formulation. 
Within Iran's unconsolidated polity, all of these political actors and their 
competing ideologies play key roles in influencing the country's foreign policy making. 
While many of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy actions may seem self-defeating one 
must consider the factional and highly competitive political environment in which they 
are developed as well as their intended impact on the internal balance of power. Failing 
to recognize the impact of these actors accounts for the often myopic analysis provided 
and generated by many US policy makers. Sim:ply put, when -studying the formulation of 
Iranian foreign policy, one cannot focus exclusively on the role of pne factor, be it 
bureaucratic politics, interest groups, or powerful individuals. In Iranian politics and by 
extension foreign policy, all of these political actors are important and must be 
understood before the ~ationality of Iranian actions can be understood. 
11 
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III. EXPORTING REVOLUTION-ERA OF THE RADICAL IDEOLOGUES 
Since its very beginning, revolu~ionary Iran has been composed of multiple 
autonomous groups committed to their own agendas and h~cking any loyalty to a higher 
central authority when it conflicts with factional interests. While Khomeini was indeed 
the most powerful personality of Iran's 1979 Revolution, neither Khomeini nor any other 
individual or group since the birth of the Islamic Republic has ever been successful in 
fully consolidating power. 
One of the most remarkable features of the "rule of the ayatollahs" has 
been the degree to which this relatively small group of men, in spite of 
their many similarities in social origin and intellectual background, have 
disagreed on some of the most fundamental issues concerning the nature 
of an Islamic society and government, and have formed alliances and 
counter-alliances based on ideological affinities or political 
expediencies ... [D]ifferent "Islamic tendencies" coalesced into two major 
camps, the "conservatives" and the "radicals" ... Iranian elite politics 
during t~e 1980s was a story of rivalri~s, shifting alliances and conflicts 
between these two factions. 11 
Although this factional discord is evident in most spheres of government activity, 
it has often had its greatest impact on the government's practice of foreign policy. As 
pragmatic elements in Iran. h.ave attempt~d to take a more moderate, less confrontational, . 
approach in inter-state relations, they· have been hindered by the influence and 
intransigence of hard-line and conservative opposition. 
Iran's foreign policy has been in complete disarray for a long period of 
time mainly due to the existence of extreme factionalism within the 
government and the regime. On the one hand, you have relative 
pragmatists - and I stress relative, people like Rafsanjani - and you have 
ideologues on the· other hand who want to export the revolution and 
II Ali Banuazizi, "Iran's Revolutionary Impasse: Political Factionalism and Societal Resistance," Middle 
East Report 24:6, November-December 1994, p. 2-3 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
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continue to support the ideals of the radical Islamic approach in foreign 
policyY 
A. FOUNDATION OF KHOMEINI'S RADICAL VANGUARD 
1. The Radical Left 
The cause of Iran's poor cohesion was largely due to the factional fighting 
between Iran's ruling clerics, representing the country's political left and right, and 
university educated non-clerical Islamist supporters of the revolution. The left was 
represented by the radical hard-line clerical faction who had, since the early days of the 
revolution, been developing their vision"of "Islamic socialism" lead by Khomeini's vision 
of velayat-e-faqih (guardianship of the jurist). Khomeini' s theory of velayat-e-faqih, 
while having no foundation in Islam, had great appeal for young radical mullahs and low 
to mid-level hojjatolislams who had been devoted disciples of Khomeini since before the. 
. ( . 
revolution. These revolutionaries were not cut from the same cloth as their more senior 
and established cleric brothers and therefore had no desire to spend their days studying 
obscure Shi'i religious doctrine in Qom. For them, Khomeini's decision to use his legion 
of followers to create and staff his Islamic republic was much more exciting. T~ese 
young revolutionaries came from poorer backgrounds and therefore had a strong 
commitment to the Mostaza 'faan (the revolution's term for the downtrodden oppressed 
masses, Iran's lower economic classes of the urban slums). 
12 "Interview with Graham Fuller," Middle East Policy, Vol. II, 1993, No.3, p. 130. 
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a. The Bonyads 
The radicals demanded the state provide the basic needs for the population 
- housing, food, health care, education, and land reform. To realize their vision they 
succeeded, in nationalizing a wide range of private enterprises. These appropriated 
enterprises, known as bonyads, represent Iran's largest holding companies. The largest, 
the Bonyade M ostaza 'faan (Foundation of the Oppressed) is made up of some 1,200 
firms. It was established with money confiscated from the Shah's family and from 
prominent industrialists who fled the revolution. 
The bonyads essentially have the power of a state within a state and have 
given the radicals a tremendous amount of autonomy. Their financial interests range 
from mining, housing construction, transportation, hotels, to tourism. The government 
has little control over the foundation and it is unable to levy taxes or monitor its foreign 
currency disbursements. The bonyads were designed to support the "victims of the Shah" 
and the wounded of the eight -year war with Iraq. The remainder of its profits are to be 
used for education in poorer areas of the country. However, it is difficult for outsiders to 
trace the legitimacy of their financial dealings which may include support for 
transnational terrorist activities. 
2. The Conservative Clerics 
At the opposite end of the religious spectrum are Iran's much larger right wing 
collection of influential, and traditionally better-off conservative clerics. This group 
stood for the sanctity of private property and wanted a minimum of government 
interference in the economy. Their vision was one. of Islamic capitalism. Not 
15 
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surprisingly the conservative clerics were supported by landlords who feared the radicals' 
commitment to land reform. They wer~ also supported by wealthy bazaaris who owed 
their fortunes and continued livelihoods to trading, commerce, and speculation. 13 This' 
alliance, between the bazaaris and the clergy, is well established in Iran. 
The ulama had strong ties with the bazaar classes (called in Persian 
bazaaris), including both the bazaar elite of merchants engaged in long-
distance and international trade and the larger group of bazaar artisan-
shopkeepers, organized into guilds. Ulama and bazaaris often belonged to 
the same families; much ulama income came from levies paid mainly by 
bazaaris; the guilds often celebrated religious or partly religious 
ceremonies for which the services of ulama were needed; and piety and 
religious observances were among the signs of bazaar standing or 
leadership. (Even today respectable bazaar shopkeepers and 
moneylenders are often addressed as "Hajji," whether or not the speaker 
knows if the addressee has made a pilgrimage justifying this form of 
address.) Entry into the ulama through study was an avenue of upward 
social mobility and entailed more respect than entry in Qajar service. 
Mosques and shrines were a major area of bast (refuge) for individuals 
. 14 
and grol,lps' that feared governmental ~est or harassment. . 
While both the radicals and conservatives vied for Ayatollah Khomeini's 
endorsement, he did not typically take sides in the struggles. It was more common for 
him to act as an arbitrator, bouncing back and fourth between each side ensuring neither 
. got the upper hand of the other. Nevertheless, it was obvious that he was sympathetic to' 
the socio-economic agenda of the radicals and its goal of improving the lives of the 
mostaza 'faan. This is illustrated by a quote from the Tehran Times in 1982, "We must 
13 Bazaaris are Iran's traditional business and trader class, ranging from small family owned shops in the 
bazaar to the much larger bazaar money lender and even bigger businesses. 
14 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modem Iran (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981), p. 32-33. 
16 
make all efforts to serve .the mostaza 'faan who has been oppressed throughout history, 
and the government should always give priority to him.,,15 After all, although the 
revolution was lead by the middle class, its foundation was built on the support of the 
mostaza 'faan. ill addition, the revolution also had a commitment to provide for the 
financial and social welfare for families of the legions of mostaza 'faan who became 
shaheed (martyrs) in the war against Iraq. 
B. THE BATTLE FOR DOMINANCE 
The seizure of the American Embassy in 1979 is arguably the best, though little 
appreciated, example of inter-group conflict in Iran. ill November 1979, when militant 
students seized the American embassy in Tehran and took American citizens hostage, 
Iran's political authority was anything but consolidated. While there were government 
groups involved in decision making~ they were not united and therefQre, unable to carry 
out their desires. Relative "moderates" in the Prime Minister's office and Foreign 
Ministry (such as Bazargan, Bani Sadr, Ghotbzadeh, and Yazdi) opposed the embassy 
seizure. However, the more "radical" clergy, led by Ayatollah Behesti, and the militant 
students holding the embassy favored a less diplomatic approach. Therefore, in spite of 
the numerous efforts on the part of "moderates" to effect an end to the crisis, radical 
opposition in the Revolutionary Council and among the student militants was successful 
in prolonging the crisiS. 16 
15 Tehran Times, 19 September 1982; p. 1, quoted by Cheryl Benard & Zalmay KhaIilzad in The 
Government of God: Iran's Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 66. 
16 Margret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior," in New Directions in the 
Study of Foreign Policy, C. Hermann (ed.) (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 323. 
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The hard-line followers of Khomeini were further emboldened by the 
revolutionary religious rhetoric of their spiritual and temporal guide. In a speech 
commemorating the first anniversary of the Shah's overthrow, Khomeini stated, 
We will export our revolution to the four comers of the world because our 
revolution is Islamic, and the struggle will continue until the cry of La 
ilaha ilia 'llah (there is no God but Allah) and wa Muhammad rasul-ullah 
(and Muhammad is the messenger of God) prevails throughout the 
world. 17 
Khomeini's messianic vision served to increase the level of paranoia among 
Iran's neighbors in the Persian Gulf, but more importantly, it encouraged a fanatical 
devotion to the regime'~ leadership which was crucial during the revolution's very fragile 
consolidation phase. 
c. RADICALS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY 
These early examples of radicalism's triumph over moderation strengthened the 
more radical factions in Iran. A day after the seizure of the American Embassy 
I'moderate~' Prime Minister Bazargan resigned, citing the widening ideological gap 
between himself and Khomeini. 18 Later, in 1981~ Iran's radical modernist president, Bani 
Sadr, was dismissed, further strengthening the hand of hard-liners. 19 However, more 
importantly, the seizure of the US Embassy established a precedence for future foreign 
17 Speech by Ayatollah Khomeini. Quoted by Benard and Khalizad, p. 148. 
18 David Menashri, Iran-A Decade of War and Revolution (New York: Homes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 
1990), p. 112. . 
19 Bani Sadr had been a threat to radical cleric's domination of the government because of his desire for 
increased executive power (in the style of Western presidents). 
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policy "free-lancing" by individual groups bent on spreading Iran's revolutionary brand 
of Islam through less than diplomatic means. 
During the period from 1979 - 1984, Iran's foreign policy establishment lost 
hundreds of experienced diplomats?O Seasoned diplomats were replaced by semi-literate 
young religious ideologues eager to do the "Imam's" bidding. Some of these new 
members of the foreign service corps were none other than those who had participated in 
the previous seizure ofthe American Embassy.21 Consequently, the way in which they 
were to practice foreign diplomacy should have come as no surprise. 
D. POST -REVOLUTION FOREIGN POLICY - HOSTAGE TO IDEOLOGY 
From the very beginning of its establishment, the Islamic Republic's hard-line 
foreign ministry espoused Islamic inte~ationalism. This rather amorphous concept 
focused on the "oneness" of the Muslim world and challenged the artificial divisions 
created by current and past colonialists and "tyrannical self-seeking rulers.,,22 Iran's 
revolutionaries sought to correct the errors of the past by spreading their liberating 
Islamic ideology throughout the Muslim wor~d and beyond. Because the revolution ~ame 
to Iran so quickly, and rather easily, the revolutionary elite became convinced that its 
attractiveness could be exported to the third world in general and the Muslim world in 
particular . 
20 John W. Limbert, "Islamic Republic ofIran," in The Government and Politics of the Middle East and 
North Africa, David E. Long and Bernard Reich (ed.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 60. 
21 Ibid. . 
22 The Guardian, November 1978. Quoted by Benard and Khalilzad, p. 147. 
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Since Iran had institutionalized an Islamic state, it had the experience and 
the authority to set a precedent to lead the new movements, and to 
formulate the ideas needed for structural and incremental change ... One of 
the prevailing precepts of Iranian foreign policy has been tQ portray Iran as 
the nucleus, or center, or the Islamic movements, national resistance 
movements, and the third world assertiveness.23 
However, within the Islamic Republic considerable ambiguity remained regarding 
how its liberating brand of Islam would be spread and who would take the lead in its 
export. Hard-line ideologues favored spreading the virtues of Islamic liberation with the 
. . 
"point of a sword" and through the subversion of other governments. These die-hards 
were firm believers in the inevitability of conflict between their pure Islamic state and the 
rest of the world. However, more pragmatic supporters of the revolution favored a less 
confrontational approach. These elements wanted Iran to serve as a model for the world 
and supported coexistence with non-Islamic states. 
The Iran-Iraq war was perhaps the first example of Iran's new foreign policy 
ideology in action. The war could be described as a confrontation between Khomeini's 
pan-Islamism and Saddam Hussein's pan-Arabi sm. Although domestic power politics as 
well as regional political hegemony were involved, the ideologies of each side were used 
as important legitimizers to wage war.24 Additionally, when Iran's Gulf neighbors chose 
sides, opting to support Iraq, Iran's attempts to destabilizing regional regimes were 
legitimized. 
23 Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Conceptual Sources of Post-Revolutionary Iranian Beharvior Toward the Arab 
World," Iran and the Arab World (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1993), p. 21. 
24 Ibid., p. 30. 
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1. Exporting the Revolution 
As Iran's foreign diplomacy increasingly rejected traditional tenet of diplomatic 
behavior, it quickly became apparent to many Gulf sheikdoms that their fragile states 
were to experience the brunt of Iran's revolutionary fervor. 
a. Iran's Emissaries 
Iran's hard-line dominated foreign ministry began by dispatching regional 
emissaries. The regime's emissaries and propaganda machinery called on people of the 
region to rebel against their governments. However, Iran's activities involved inore that 
just propaganda. Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reportedly provided guerilla 
training for groups from several Muslim countries. 
Among the Gulf states, many with large of Shi'i communities such as 
Ba.l?rain and Kuwait, felt particularity vUlnerable to· Iranian manipulations. The former 
Iranian territory of Bahrain became a frequent target of Iranian interference.25 However, 
the small Gulf emirates were not the only states targeted by Iran. In the early 1980s, 
Iran's revolutionaries also encouraged Islamic revolts in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. All the 
Gulf monarchies were denounced by.Khomeini as atheist and ~llegitimate governments, 
dependent on the US. 
b. Hajj Propaganda Campaigns 
In addition to attempting to destabilize governments domestically, Iran 
also used Islamic and regional gatherings to mobilize support for their ideology. In 1981 
and 1982 Iran was accused of inciting clashes between Iranian Hajj pilgrims and Saudi 
25 In 1981, Bahrain accused Iran of sponsoring a coupe attempt by a multinational group. 
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security forces. Iran's revolutionary leaders regarded the Hajj particularly as a prime 
venue to promote its propaganda goals. In preparation for the 1982 pilgrimage season, 
Khomeini appointed Muhammad Musavi Kho'iniha, the former religious guide for the 
students who had seized the US Embassy in 1979, to supervise Iran's 95,000 pilgrims and 
carry-out Khomeini' s propaganda campaign. Iran's Hajj preparations were well 
coordinated and included smuggling propaganda material into Saudi Arabia, as well as 
the publishing and distributing of material during the Hajj. When Saudi authorities 
responded to Iranian provocations, Iran challenged the Kingdom's position as guardian 
for the two holy places. Kho'iniha stated that since Iran was "the most powerful Muslim 
state" it should administer the Hajj.26 
Iran's biggest challenge to the Kingdom occurred during the 1987 Hajj 
pilgrimage when more than 400 people were killed in clashes between Iranian Shi'i 
pilgrims and Saudi security forces. Khomeini cursed Saudi Arabian King Fahd, blaming 
him for the bloodshed and declaring him unfit to be the guardian of Islam's two holiest 
shrines. Iran then boycotted the Hajj for three years?7 
2. Costs of Id~ological Export 
The continued ideological proselytization and subversive activities of Iran's hard-
liners exacted a price on Iran. When Iraq invaded Iran, and throughout the eight years of 
war, there was little sympathy for the Islamic Republic within the region or in the 
26 Ette/a 'at, 3 August 1983. Quoted by Menashri, p. 293 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
27 "Iran Paper Cautions Against Soft Line of Saudi," Reuters, 11 June 1992 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
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international community.28 Countries which may have come to Iran's aid, chose instead 
to stand by, content to see the Gulf's two bullies bloody themselves. As a consequence, 
one might expect the war to have prompted Iran to seek better relations with its neighbors 
as a means of weakening support for Iraq. However, just the opposite was true. The war 
actually further radicalized Iranian foreign policy. Basically, until the end of the war, the 
Iranian government made no attempt to change its foreign policy and the balance among 
the domestic policy makers remained unchanged and perhaps unchangeable. 
E. THE RISE OF THE PRAGMATISTS 
In the late 1980s, as the contests and debates between radical and conservative 
factions continued to paralyze Iran, a new group began to emerge from within the clerical 
establishment and society'. This new group, lead by MajIis speaker (and future president) 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, attempted to fill the vacuum left by Ayatollah 
Khomeini's retreat as the center of all decision making. Characterized by its pragmatism, 
this group contained an alliance of technocrats and conservative and pragmatic clerics, 
and established a mid~le ground between the two prevailing religious factions. These 
.pragmatists displayed less self-interest and were more focused on the best interests of the 
republic. Its members had become increasingly disenchanted with Iran's self-destructive 
socio-economic course, the war with Iraq, and the country's paranoid and contradictory 
foreign policy. However, this new pragmatic element was hamstrung by the continuing 
28 Mansour Farhang, "The Iran-Israel Connection," Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter 1989, Vol. 11, No.1, p. 
88. 
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bloody war between Iran and Iraq and the ability it gave the radicals to control the 
economy and to resist challenge from internal opposition. 
The pragmatists challenged the hard-liners commitment to the war. The radical 
clerics believed the war would continue until a final victory for Iran was achieved and 
that only this outcome would bring a "new Islamic era" to the Muslim world. The 
pragmatists on the other hand, having resigned themselves by early 1987 that a military 
defeat of Iraq was unlikely, seized the opportunity in July 1988 to encourage Khomeini to 
finally agree to a cease-fire with Iraq. 
With the war over the radicals were no longer able to exploit the war with Iraq to 
justify thelr repressive social measures and austere economic practices. In addition, 
because Khomeini was no longer functioning as the center for all political decision 
making, the radicals had lost a considerable measure of their political influence. 
Recognizing Khomeini was no longer protecting the balance of power between the 
ideological factions, the pragmatic clerics went to work.29 
Rafsanjani and Khamenei spent the year between the acceptance of the 
July 1988 cease-fire with Iraq and Ayatollah Khomeini's death in June 
1989 implementing a mUlti-pronged strategy to divest the radicals of their 
strangle-hold on power by attacking them politically, deriding ~heir 
ideological message, and eroding their institutional power base. The 
strategy accelerated once Rafsanjani was elected President in 1989 and 
Khamenei became Supreme Leader. The hard-liners were out-
maneuvered in the political process by the de facto alliance that emerged 
in 1989 between Rafsanjani and the technocrats, on the one hand, and the 
conservatives, on the other.3o 
29 Ahmad Salamatian, "La Revelution Iranienne Broye par ses Contradictions" Le Monde Diplomatique, 20 
June 1993. Quoted by Ahmed Hashim in "The Crisis of the Iranian State," Adelphi, Paper 296 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 11. 
30 Ahmed Hashim, "The Crisis of the Iranian State," Adelphi, Paper 296 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1995), p. 11. 
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F. SATANIC VERSES & FOREIGN POLICY CONTRADICTIONS 
Unfortunately a period that might have been regarded as a much more progressive 
stage in the evolution of Iranian foreign policy was derailed because of Iran's lack of 
political and foreign policy cohesion. In February 1989, on the heels of violent 
demonstrations in India and Pakistan, Khomeini issued a Jatwa calling for the death of 
Salman Rushdie because of his book, The Satanic Verses. 3} Although Khomeini was no 
longer physically sitting at Tehran's political center, he was capable of hijacking the 
Islamic Republic's foreign policy process. Khomeini's deathJatwa dealt the already 
struggling regime a serious setback in their efforts to improve relations with Western 
Europe. 
Khomeini's action begged the question: Given the fact that Khomeini had blessed 
Rafsanjani's rapprochement policy, why did he purposely torpedo the pragmatist's 
. I .' 
efforts? The answer is: He may not have intended to do so. 
Khomeini's initial angry reaction to The Satanic Verses and his death 
decree for Rushdie may have been more of an emotional outburst than a 
pre-planned move against the pragmatists. A similar outburst had 
occurred a few weeks earlier. In that case Khomeini had asked for the 
severe punishment of five radio officials who were responsible for a 
disrespectful program regarding the daughter of the Prophet Mohammad. 
A woman interviewed on the program had suggested that her role model 
was a Japanese television personality and not the Prophet's daughter, 
Fatima. In his angry response, Khomeini called for the death of those 
responsible if it was intentional and heavy punishment if it was not. A 
few days later he forgave all of them.32 
31 Maziar Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran," in Neither East Nor 
West, Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (ed.) (New York: Yale University Press, 1990), p 31-32. 
32 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, his proclamation had the effect of distracting many from the 
reforming and progressive efforts of the pragmatics; and in essence it reinforced 
the mindset of a number of Western countries that the Iranian regime' was radical 
to the bone. But more importantly, it highlighted the handicaps reformers faced 
when their attempts to moderate policy were opposed by strong competing 
factions or respected individuals. 
Although Khomeini's actions undoubtedly came as an embarrassment to 
Rafsanjani and his allies, their plans for rapprochement remained largely intact. 
Therefore, when Khomeini died in July 1989, the pragmatists were still in a strong 
position and Rafsanjani lost no time in publicly re-engaging the West. Five days after 
Khomeini's death, he reached out to the West, stating that it was the Islamic Republic's 
desire to have normal relations with the West if Iran was able to retain its independence.33 
However, if Rafsanjani's camp hoped that the European Union's (EU) stem 
response to the Rushdie affair had weakened factions beyond their alliance, they must 
have been disappointed. Although the EU's response was uncharacteristically firm, few 
Western states allowed their outrage to interfere with deals already made with the IsI.amic 
Republic. France's Industry Minister, Roger Fauroux, stated that attempts to improve 
trade relations should continue despite the Rushdie affair, and Britain's Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, conceded that " ... economic sanctions are not something 
that we normally reach for.,,34 As a consequence, while Rafsanjani was dealt a setback, 
the hard-line clergy emerged relatively unscathed. Comments made by Dr. Yazdi, Iran's 
33 Iran Times, 24 Feb '1989, in Neither East Nor West, p. 33. 
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first post-revolution Foreign Minister further reinforce this fact, "The multiplicity of 
centers of power is, if anything, increasil1g. This leads to paralysis, and that is where we 
are.,,35 
G. THE STRUGGLE OVER DIPLOMATIC STYLE 
In spite of the continuing challenge from the hard-line clerical establishment, 
Iran's pragmatic politicians were hopeful that Khomeini's passing would allow them to 
exercise greater creative license and they continued to develop their reform projects. 
Rafsanjani and his camp advocated consumerism, preferring the development of 
private enterprise over state-owned management of the economy. In addition, they 
emphasized the work ethic over ideology, calling on Iranians to rid themselves of the 
notion that 'poor' was beautiful-a direct ch~lenge to the tenets of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's Islamic revolution. 36 Khomeini espoused the power of the dispossessed and 
urged Iranians to focus on the rewards and happiness awaiting the faithful in the afterlife. 
Hajatolislam Rafsanjani stressed the need for higher productivity and 
pragmatism, arguing in the same speech that even the venerated Shiite 
Muslim Imam Ali, the Muslims' leader after the Prophet Mohammed, did 
not hesitate to work for Jews, a daring proposition in a state that is a sworn 
enemy of Israel. He has opposed occasional calls by radicals to resume 
the war with Iraq to liberate occupied Iranian lands.37 
34. Douglas Stangl in and Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Diplomacy in the Dark," U.S. News & WQrld Report, Vol. 
106,p. 26 (LEXIS-NEXIS). . 
35 YoussefM. Ibrahim, "Divided Iranians Seem Unable to Settle on Firm Policy Course," The New York 




1. Recognition of Past Mistakes 
Rafsanjani understood that Iran's interests were not best served by confrontation 
with its pro-Western Arab neighbors or the rest of the world. He acknowledged that one 
of Iran's mistakes was to have made so many enemies that it was friendless and isolated 
in the eight-year war with Iraq38 According to Iran's own press agency, Rafsanjani said 
that if Iran had demonstrated greater tact in its dealings with France and Kuwait, they 
would not have supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.39 Reinforcing this belief, Rafsanjani 
declared that Iran was now in a position to "make good" its "previously crude 
diplomacy" to ensure that in future conflicts other countries would not side with Iran's 
enemy.40 Iran's foreign minister echoed Rafsanjani's sentiments stating that since the 
war with Iraq was over, there were no obstacles to improving relations with neighboring 
Arab states. Referring specifically to relations with Saudi Arabia he said, Iran was 
. I . 
willing " ... to resume direct talks with them to take serious steps to overcome the conflict 
between the two countries which has only ~een exploited by our enemies.'.41 
2. Hard-Line Resistance 
However, although Rafsanjani had won the 1989 presidential election b~ a wide 
margin he was still unable to consolidate power or effectively control the tone and 
direction of Iran's foreign policy. A treacherous domestic political front which included 
38 Scheherazade Daneshkuh, "Iran Simmers With Discontent," London 'Finan cia I Times, p. 4 (LEXIS-
NEXIS). 
39 "Iranian Officials On Making Good 'Previously Crude' Foreign Policy," The British Broadcasting 





hard-line newspapers, t~e Iranian Revolutionary Guard's (Sepah-e Pasdaran), and radical 
students in over 50 Iranian universities continued to act as a check on his ability to chart a 
more moderate course. Among these challengers, the most significant one came from 
militant hard-line opponents in the Majlis. Although radical hard-liners were among the 
minority in the Majlis at the time (130 of 270 deputies), they exerted considerable 
influence" over executive policy through their approval of cabinet appointments and were 
" able to act as an effective break on the pragmatists' moderation and bridge building 
efforts. 
When Rajai Khorassani, the pragmatic chairman of the Majlis' Foreign Relations 
Committee, suggested the time had come to improve ties with Saudi Arabia, he was 
rebuffed by Majlis deputies.42 Likewise, attempts by Rafsanjani's administration to 
begin a dialog with Great Britain were blocked by radical opposition. Ayatollah 
Mohammad Yazdi, the Chief of the Justice Ministry and Rafsanjarii.ally, encountered 
hard-line intransigence when he attempted to improve Iran's ties with Britain by meeting 
with the relative of a Briton imprisoned in Iran for espionage. Hard-line ideologues in 
the Majlis blasted Yazdi's back-door diplomacy, effectively ending negotiations before 
they even got started. 
42 Ibrahim, p. 1. 
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H. RAFSANJANI'S COALITION CRUMBLES 
1. Influence of Domestic Policy and Politics 
With the creation of the coalition between pragmatists and some conservative 
clerics and technocrats, a liberal economic strategy was adopted. The strategy, largely 
developed by Rafsanjani's technocratic dominated cabinet (the so called "PhDs with 
beards"), involved: privatization of inefficient state enterprises; removal of price 
controls; elimination of the system of subsidies; and unification of the anarchic system of 
multiple exchange rates.43 
a. Conservative Defectors 
However, when economic reforms began to be felt, support from some 
coalition members started to wane. These members began to realize the effect reforms 
would have on the allocation of resources, thei~ status, and the overall balance of power. 
Apart from disagreements regarding which restructuring techniques were best to carry 
out the needed reforms, technocrats wanted to stay the course. However, they did not 
have the political clout. Although many occupied posts as ministers and advisors, 
Rafsanjani; either on ~s own accord or due to hard-line pressure, positioned the 
,technocrats well outside the inner circles of power. 
Those conservatives that had joined the pragmatist's coalition now saw 
great appeal in preserving the status quo. But, in addition to looking out for their own 
personal interests, the conservative clerics were also under pressure from a number of 
groups including their primary support base, the country's bloated civil service work 
43 Hashim, p. 12-13. 
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force, the bazaaris, and a large numbers of lower class Iranians who had switched 
allegiance from the radical faction.44 Among the conservatives having a "change of 
heart" and migrating back to the right was Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. 
Although Rafsanjani and Khamenei essentially began the reform program 
together after the 1989 elections, as opposition to reform continued to grow, Khamenei 
began to further complicate matters for Rafsanjani and his pragmatic allies. It soon 
became difficult to distinguish between Khamenei's actions as an ally of Rafsanjani and 
his moves as an Iranian politician out to carve the premier spot for himself in the 
decision-making process. 
This became most evident in October 1989 when Khamenei reshuffled 
Iran's National Security Council to include just about every known rival of Rafsanjani. 
Among the rivals were Ahmad Khome~ni [son of Ayatollah Khomeini] who until that 
time had never held an official position in government; Mohammad Musavi Kho'iniha, 
the religious guide of the students who occupied the American Embassy and Khomeini' s 
Hajj propaganda point man; and Mehdi Karrubi, the Speaker of Parliament, a radical 
voice in the Majlis.45 
President Rafsanjani had underestimated the political aspirations of 
Ayatollah Khamenei. Rafsanjani was buoyed, no doubt, by the fact that 
his partner in the diminutive, Khamenei, not only shared his view of the 
need to reconstruct the country, but similarly lacked the qualifications 
associated with Ayatollah Khomeini, and would leave the President to run 
Iran as a powerful executive.46 
44 Ibid., p. 16-17. 
45 Ibrahim, p. 1. 
46 Amir Taheri, Teheran: Le Thermidor Avorte, Politique Intematinale, No. 64, Summer 1994, p. 7. 
Quoted in Adelphi, Paper 296, p. 18. . 
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Fearful t,hat increasing conservative and social criticism of the economic 
reforms might further impinge on support for clerical regime, Khamenei decided to ally 
himself the ruling conservative elite. Perhaps Rafsanjani should have anticipated such a 
reversal by Khamenei. After all given his limited religious qualifications, the use of his 
considerable political clout to bring and end to the reforms could increase his 
conservative and radical constituency and perhaps also boost his meager religious 
,credentials. 
, . 
By the time the 1992 Majlis was elected, a clear split was evident between 
the goals of Rafsanjani, pragmatists, conservatives, and radicals. Although Rafsanjani 
and the conservatives had formed a de Jacto alliance to remove radical opposition, it 
didn't last long. Many conservatives may have honesty believed that, in the long run, 
reform 'was necessary to preserve the system., But, in the short term, reforms were 
creating hardships across the entire social spectrum, threatening the financial interests of 
the powerful as well as the survival of "their" political system and source of power and 
patronage. They simply saw no gain in reforming themselves out of existence. 
Therefore, although the radicals were eliminated from the Majlis (but still a vocal 
opposition voice) the conservatives began to rival them by greater success in blocking 
meaningful reforms. 
To make matters worse, when Rafsanjani began his second term as 
president in 1993, Khamenei exercised even greater political power and undercut his 
ability to appoint reformers to important ministries. Those that were appointed were 
hard-line conservatives dedicated to their own narrow interests. Unfortunately, many of 
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these interests would soon be played out internationally as elements of Iran's radical 
foreign policy. 
b. . Khamenei's Bid For Dominance 
It appears that Khamenei' s goal was to preserve face for many of these 
radical leaders and discourage them from openly breaking with the regime. However, 
undoubtedly he also wanted to maintain a system of check and balances against 
Rafsanjani and reinforce his own position within the regime and among the hard-liners. 
As was apparent, Khamenei was able to successful check many of Rafsanjani's attempts 
to moderate Iranian foreign policy. 
When Rafsanjani and his pragmatics began brokering for the release of 
Western hostages held by pro-Iranian Hizbullah forces in Lebanon, and succeeded in 
gaining their release, he was reprimanded by Khamenei. When the hostages were freed 
without a reward from Washington, such as the release Iran's frozen assets, Khamenei 
said Rafsanjani had allowed Iran to be "duped by America.,,47 
Another conflict, said to have arisen between Rafsanjani and Khamenei, 
involved the lingering Salman Rushdie issue. Rafsanjani: it is said, hinted at the 
dissolution of the shadowy 15 Khordad foundation which had placed a two million dollar 
bounty on Rushdie. In rebuttal, Ayatollah Khamenei went on state radio and declared that 
47 The Times, 12 August 1994. 
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the edict against Rushdie was more than afatwa. It was a hokm, which is a ruling that 
Muslims worldwide were duty-bound to.obey.48 
I. FOREIGN POLICY "FREE-FOR-ALL" 
With divisions within Rafsanjani's fragile coalition becoming wider, Ayatollah 
Khamenei's defection from the alliance ended any hopes the pragmatists had for 
centralizing power within a consolidated government. As the various clerics settled into 
their respective positions in the councils, Majlis, and government ministries, factional 
alliances were being formed and compromises were being made.49 Some of these 
compromises undoubtedly involved granting permission to assassinate Iranian opposition 
figures outside Iran. One such operation occurred in Germany and captured a great deal 
of attention. 
1. Non-Traditional Diplomacy 
In 1992 Iran became the center of European attention when German prosecutors 
began investigating charges that Iran's Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, President 
Rafsanjani, and Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahiyan ordered the assassination of four 
Kurdish dissidents. While Iran denied the charges and condemned the trial as politically 
motivated, the German government stated there would be grave consequences if the 
allegations were proven. 
48 The Times, 12 August 1994. 
49 Middle East Po/icy, Vol. II, 1993, No.3, p. 130. 
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When the trial concluded, the court had found that the highest levels of Iran's 
leadership ordered an "official liquidation" of the Kurdish dissidents. The court imposed 
two life sentences, one on an Iranian and the other on a Lebanese. The court's decision 
triggered a round of diplomatic tit for tat as European governments recalled their 
ambassadors from Iran while the Iranians responded in kind. 50 Iran's image as an outlaw 
nation that commits state-sponsored terrorism was intensified. 
However, with the exception of several "loud" protests outside Germany's 
embassy in Tehran, Iran didn't respond as many expected. Officially Iran issued strongly 
worded protests against the court's ruling, but in the same breath stated they wanted good 
relations with Germany. Iran's foreign minister said his government drew a distinction 
between the court and the Bonn government.5l 
a. Revolutionary Ligacies, 
, If the foreign minister's comments were true, that Iran wanted good 
relations with Germany, why did the Iranian regime take such diplomatic risks to kill the 
dissidents? I believe this can largely be attributed to the fact that Iran's fragmented 
government essentially made it impossible for Rafsanjani to establish firm control over 
radical elements within his own government. This lack of strong central control made it 
very easy for individual groups, many with extremely tenuous ties to government, to 
engage in a foreign policy "free-for-all." 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
The patterns of actions suggests that these practices originated in the early 
. 1980s, when the'Islamic leadership faced ,a massive domestic terrorist 
threat. The Iranian response to this threat was apparently to establish one 
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or more covert units, possibly buried deep within the intelligence agencies, 
to hunt down and destroy perceived threats to the .revolution. This kind of 
shadow warfare is hardly unique to Iran. But the evidenced suggests that 
these units in Iran have acquired a life of their own, launchipg operations 
on an opportunistic basis with little interference by [or knowledge of] 
central authorities and no apparent coordination with Iran's foreign policy 
agenda. 52 
The ministry most likely responsible for the majority of the "foreign 
adventures" carried out in the name of the Islamic Republic is the Ministry of Intelligence 
·and Security (MOIS). Staffed by post-revolution as well as "reformed" SAVAK officers, 
this ministry has been implicated in a wide range of regional and international covert 
operations; llitd has earned the reputation as one of the most active and ruthless 
intelligence services in the world. During the last dec~de, the MOIS was headed by the 
hard-line minister Ali Fallahiyan.53 
Fallahiyan, a man possessing impeccable revolutionary credentials and an 
able organizer, had been a long time devotee of Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution. Like 
most senior officials in the Islamic Republic, he possessed a strong background in 
religion, reportedly having studied theology in Najaf (Iraq), Isfahan, and Qom. His 
devotion to the revolution was evident early on when he headed an action committee 
whose task was to bum cinemas, bookshops, girl's schools and other "places of sin" in 
Isfahan. After Khomeini won power, Fallahiyan was chosen to lead a special squad 
charged with hunting down officials of the Shah's former regime. In 1984 he joined the 
52 Gary Sick, "The Two Faces ofIran; Rafsanjani's Moderation, The Mullah's Holy Terror," The 
Washington Post, 4 April 1993, Section: Outlook, p. CI (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
53 Bizhan Torabi, "Teheran's Chief Spy Keeps A Low Profile After German Arrest Warrant," Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 20 March 1996 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
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newly-created Ministry of Intelligence and Security as director of counter-espionage. In 
1988 he was appointed Minister for Intelligence and Security. 54 
The minister of intelligence is considered to be the regime's fifth most 
powerful position, a member of the High Council of National Security (the country's 
supreme decision-making body) and Inspector-General of the Armed Forces. Fallahiyan 
was also a member of the Special Court, a tribunal which deals with charges against 
senior clergy. In his various capacities his approval was required for high-level 
appointments in the army, the civil and the diplomatic services. 55 
As indicated by the German courts, it was agents of Fallahiyan' s ministry 
which were responsible for the assassination of the Kurdish opposition figures in Berlin. 
The court verdict is perhaps further supported by a boast the MOIS minister made two 
days before the Germany court issued a warrant for his. aITe~t. 56 Speaking on Iranian 
. I 
television, he presented an end of year progress report on his ministry's achievements. 
Among the ministry's boasted achievements was "the elimination of the enemies of the 
revolution abroad," an obvious reference to the assassination of the four Kurds gun;ned 
down in Berlin as well as other enemies of the state who had met a similar fate. 57 
2. Rafsanjani's "Horse-Trading" 
Another complimentary n,l.tionale for Iran's often contradictory foreign policy 
actions in these c~ses further illustrates the vulnerability of Rafsanjani's unconsolidated 






Rafsanjani and his pragmatic camp may have had to resort to a form of "horse-trading" to 
achieve their broader goals. 
Rafsanjani has shown growing ability to dominate a great many of the 
policy-making cirCles, but he is least successful when it comes to Muslim 
issues and ideological issues. He is even inclined to give these issues 
away, at least he has in the past.58 
The new alliance of the conservatives and radicals that had risen to dominate Iran 
after the 1992 Majlis elections had essentially neutered Rafsanjani and the pragmatists. 
By late 1995 and early 1996 Rafsanjani and his reformers were under increasing pressure 
from hard-liners, especially those in the Majlis, who had been calling for the 
impeachment of him and his cabinet. With little hope of achieving any effective leverage 
over foreign policy formulation Rafsanjani may have held out some hope that by turning 
. a blind eye he could win some concessions from the radicals on domestic economic 
reforms. While having little realistic choice, he undoubtedly hoped that the costs of his 
acquiescence would not be too great. 
3. Forces Beyond' Control 
While Rafsanjani may have indeed hoped to "deal" with his reform resistant 
opponents in government, his ability to entice all of the powerful forces in Iranian society 
was extremely limited. Among these forces is the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. 
(IRGC) which is answerable only to Iran's Supreme Leader. The IRGC has been 
suspected of supporting opposition groups in many of the Gulf countries that allied 
themselves with Iraq during the Gulf War. The Guards Corps also maintains positions at 
58 Fuller interview, Middle East Policy; Vol. II, 1993 
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all Iranian embassies from which they have recruited agents for operations. They have 
funneled financial and material support ~o foreign insurgents and groups such as 
Hizbullah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Moro (secessionists in the Philippines), and Algeria's 
Islamic Salvation Front.59 
While Rafsanjani has at times appeared to challenge the activities of some of his 
government's less accountable organizations, he has not had much success. 
As an example, Rafsanjani was thwarted in his efforts to curtail the activities of the 
Hizbullah commander responsible for the kidnapping of Western hostages in Beirut in the 
1980s. Moreover, the individual, Emad Mughniyeh, was awarded his own section, the 
Department of Qods (Jerusalem) Operations within the Ministry of Intelligence and 
Islamic Guidance, which was allegedly tasked with targeting soft Israeli and Jewish 
targets around tl1e world.6o According to a C~ testimony before the US Senate 
intelligence committee, it was Mughniyeh's section which is believed to have recruited 
from among the Shi'i Muslim community in Argentina to organize the 1994 bombing 
attack on the Jewish center in Buenos Aires.61 As an indication of just how removed the 
president may have been from operations such as these; reports have alleged that 
Rafsanjani was not informed of the planned operation and reacted with a great amount of 
indignation in his next meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei. 62 
59 Al Venter, "Iran Still Exporting Terrorism to Spread Its Islamic Vision," Jane's Intelli~ence Review, 
Section: Southwest Asia; Vol. 9; No. 11, p. 511 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
60 The Times, 12 August 1994. 
61 Ibid. . 
62 Leslie Plommer, "Ayatollah's Legacy is Iranian Isolation," The Guardian, 4 June 1994, p. 17. 
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Other forces which have consistently been beyond the pragmatists ability to 
control are the shadowy compartmented groups and foundations answerable only to 
Iran's Supreme Leader-and that many even be a tenuous chain of command. These 
groups, often identified collectively as the Bonyad-e Mostaza 'faan (Foundation of the 
Oppressed) are suspected of supporting MOIS and IRGC operations, to include direct 
funding of foreign political and dissident groups.63 
These semi-private and ostensibly charitable foundations are in command 
of billions of dollars derived from companies they own in Iran and 
throughout the world. It was one of these bonyads, the Bonyad-e 15 
Khordad, that has offered the $2 million reward for the assassination of 
Salman Rushdie. Behind these bonyads stands the political clergy. And 
behind them stands the still powerful ghost of Khomeini. 64 
The bonyads can be an extremely effective tool for their hard-line supporters in 
Iran. Because these groups have no official ties to the government, the regime retains a 
. I . 
level of plausible deniability for their actions. Of course this assumes the bonyads are 
even implicated at all. Because the bonyads have no shareholders, no public accounts, 
and answer only to Khamenei they are able to operate with a high degree of secrecy. In 
some cases, when operations are developed using several levels of "cut-outs," re.cipients 
of Bonyad support may not even know the identity-let alone the nationality-of their 
generous benefactor. Such may have been the case when Bahrain's government 
continuously accused Iran in 1996 of supporting insurgents attempting to topple its 




on US military targets in Saudi Arabia may also unknowingly owe their successes to 
Iran's "NGOs." 
Meanwhile, Rafsanjani and other Iranian officials were left to deny (albeit in II.10st 
cases untruthfully) that "Iran as a state" was not involved in the acts of which it was 
accused. Nevertheless, the US and most other governments refused to make a distinction 
between official and unofficial Iranian actions and many countries have joined with the 
US in supporting severe economic sanctions against Iran. The result for Iran was a 
continuance of inter-government factionalism as hard-liners sought to safeguard their 
positions by strengthening social controls on Iran's population and deflect blame for the 
failed reforms on the pragmatics. 
J. THE SEEDS OF· REVOLUTION 
As Iran's middle and lower class population continued to s.uffer from the 
country's economic malaise, an increasing percentage felt change was impossible if it 
depended on the corrupt and self-serving clerical government. This feeling was best 
represented in. the aby~mal tum-out for the 1993 presidential election. When the number 
.of voters participating in the political process was tabulated, it represented only 57 
percent of the republic's eligible voters - the lowest tum-out since the establishment of 
the Islamic Republic.65 The society's pessimism was no doubt further reinforced after the 
1996 Majlis elections. As the elections approached, greater demand for political 
pluralism was evident and several political groupings were endorsing slates of technocrat 
65 Hashim, p. 21. 
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candidates.66 However, the right-wing conservative clerical faction was well aware of the 
threat the technocrats represented. As a result, the conservative clerics, with a strong 
endorsement from bazaaris, rose up again, labeled the technocrats "liberals" and 
ultimately succeeded in shutting them OUt.67 
As a result of these examples, and the legacy of clerical corruption and self-
aggrandizement, a growing segment of Iran's population began to join the ranks of those 
who have traditionally questioned the form and effectiveness of the government installed 
by the revolution. 
In spite of the early intellectual opposition to velayat-e-faqih, grassroots 
opposition did not form quickly. However, as the failures of the regime continued 
unabated, the majority of society began to see the gap between themselves and the 
we~thy ruling clergy (both conservative and radical) continuing to grow. An increasing 
alienation began to take place. One way in which this alienation has manifest itself in 
society is a visible decrease in devotion to Islam - the regime's Friday sermons that 
preached the virtues of Islam began falling on deaf ears.68 Even more troubling for the 
political clergy is the effect alienation is having on the urban P90r (mostaza'jaan). 
Having increasingly come to feel that they have been betrayed by the leaders of "their" 
revolution, they have begun to vent their frustrations in violent activities. 
Consequently, in failing to live up to its post-revolutionary promises, the clerical 
66 Stephen C. Fairbanks, "Theocracy Versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties," The Middle 
East Journal, Winter 1998, Vol. 5, No.1, p. 23-24. 
67 Ibid., p. 24. 
68 Edward Shirley, "Iran's Present, Algeria's Future?" Foreign Affairs, May-June 1995, p. 39 (LEXIS-
NEXIS). 
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regime has lost the enor:mous base of popular support it enjoyed in the early days. By 
1995 it was estimated that Iran's theocratic style of government has the support of less 
than 15 percent ofthe population.69 Such was the state of affairs h-an's current president. 
Mohammad Khatami inherited in August 1997. 
69 Richard Cottam, Ellen Laipson, and Gary Sick, "Symposium: US Policy Toward Iran: From 
Containment to Relentless Pursuit?" Middle East Policy, Vol. IV, Nos. 1&2, September 1995, p. 10. 
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IV. KHATAMI'S FOREIGN POLICY GRAND STRATEGY & 
THE PAYOFFS OF RAPPROCHEMENT 
More than any event since the revolution, the election of President Khatami in 
1997 highlighted the pervasive dissatisfaction present within Iranian society. Khatami's 
election represented more than just a vote for a particular president, it was a call for a 
total change in the political, economic, and social climate of Iran. Now, one year later, 
Iranians have begun to enjoy some of the fruits of "their victory." However, while there 
are now fewer social restrictions and a freer press, Iran's economic condition has seen 
little improvement. Iran continues to suffer from the legacies of the early years of the 
revolution, in particular the disastrous eight year war with Iraq and the long-running 
corrupt and inefficient management of state-owned businesses and government 
bureaucracies. 
Iran's 1997 presidential election came at a time of widespread economic 
discontent. A year before the rate of inflation peaked at about 50 percent. Recent 
figures indicate that it has dropped down to about 23 percent.70 After years of stagnation, 
Iran's GDP is finally expanding at a steady rate .of 3 to 4 percent, but oil production is 
still down more than 30 percent since 1979 and unemployment remains high with few job 
prospects for the young.71 The 1997 predictions state Iran needs $100 billion for the next 
ten years, in addition to projected oil exports, to finance a budget that would only 
maintain the status quO.72 Keeping up with dept payments totaling over $35 billion, 
70 Robin Wright and Shaul Bakhash, "The US and Iran: An Offer They Can't Refuse," Foreign Policy, No. 
108, Fall 1997, p. 126. 
71 Ibid. 
72 "Hate Me, Love My Gas," The Economist, 4 October 1997, p. 51. 
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which is increasing in principle and interest, will make it very difficult for Iran to fund 
any sizable growth in its economy or inc;lustry.73 
While Iran's economic woes are not nearly as severe as those of many other third-
world countries, Khatarni's promises of reform created grand expectations among 
Iranians. These expectations continue to be reinforced as the more open press 
increasingly publishes stories revealing that the standard of living for most middle-class 
Iranians has declined since the revolution?4 
Increasingly people want straight answers to their economic woes. A 
rising unemployment and inflation rate, coupled with a sharp decline in oil 
prices world wide, have hurt the nation as a whole ... The average man or 
woman on the street is really not interested in economic statistics or 
details. It is a bread and butter issue. It is as simple as that. Economic 
survival is what counts, many heads of households are working two or 
three jobs and are still not making ends meet. There is a general feeling 
among political analysts that government is underestimating the degree of 
people'~ discontent about economic p~oblems.75 
In this chapter I will argue that Khatarni and. his pragmatic alliance are not 
underestimating the significance of their constituency's discontentment. On the contrary, 
Khatarni realizes the number one determinant of his coalition's survival depends on 
.improving the country's economy. In response to this imperative he and his team have 
developed a foreign policy strategy capable of achieving economic recovery and at the 
same time having the broader collateral effects of reducing domestic opposition (thereby 
73 Ibid. 
74 Iran's media (conservative, liberal, and Iran's official Iran News Agency) increasingly have published 
reports critical of the Islamic Republic's economic management since the 1979 Revolution. See articles 
such as, "Economic Discontent," a 26 May 1998 editorial published in Iran's English language Iran Daily. 
75 "Economic Discontent," Iran Daily, 26 May 1998, SeCtion: Editorial. Quoted by Iran News Agency, 
http://www.irna.comlnewshtmlengl05004552.htm. 
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winning greater social and political freedom) and ending Iran's reputation as the world's 
premiere state sponsor of terrorism. The foreign policy tactic which Khatami has chosen 
to employ to achieve his strategy involves liberalizing the economy through greater 
regional cooperation- specifically sending positive signals and making slow, yet 
perceptible, movements toward rapprochement with the US. 
In light of the political, as well as personal, risks this strategy presents to 
Khatami, there is little doubt he wishes there were another way for him to deliver the 
needed reforms. The fact some might like to imagine that Khatami honestly fongs for a 
make-up between his country and the US is of no consequence, the stark reality of the 
US' domination of the global environment, and Iran's domestic needs, leave Khatami 
little choice. 
A. ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND COOPERATION THEORY 
Of particular assistance in understanding what I believe is Iran's motivation for 
rapprochement with the US is Etel Solingen's work, "Democracy, Economic Reform and 
Regional Cooper~tion."76 Although geographically the US is di.stant from Iran, its global 
presence in the world's economic market has enabled it to stand in the way of many of 
Iran's economic aspirations. Therefore, Solingen's theories are suitable for analyzing 
Iran's foreign policy relative to the US. Solingen describes the relationship between 
economic liberalization and regional cooperation this way: 
76 Etel Solingen, "Democracy, Economic Reform and Regional Cooperation," Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, Vol. 8, No.1, January 1998. 
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Political coalitions more strongly committed to economic liberalization are 
also more likely to undertake regional cooperative postures. In contrast, 
coalitions aggregating nationalist and statist interests [Iran's hard-line 
clerical ideologues] might be expected to endorse less cooperative 
positions vis-a-vis regional partners. 77 
This is not the traditional argument of cooperation driven by interdependence, but 
rather a more non-traditional theory which assumes that political coalitions cooperate 
regionally to safeguard their domestic interests and, in the case of Iran, to promote their 
interests. As Solingen states, "Quite often, the interests of political coalitions favoring 
broader economic liberalization (market oriented, privatizing, state-shrinking reforms) 
require openness to global markets, capital investments, and technology.,,78 When I 
began to analyze Solingen's theories, I realized they copld serve as a virtual overlay for 
Iran's current political and economic environment. 
Khatami's pragmatic coalition is certainly composed of, and appeals to, many of 
those elements Solingen identifies as beneficiaries of economic reform: professional 
groups, such as technical, scientific, educational groups; those involved in export-
oriented enterprises; members of the banking establishment; advocates of greater 
industrial development;' and service oriented ent~rprises. 79 Some of Khatarni' s most 
ardent supporters are the country's commercial elite who want an opening with the US. 
Although Iran's trade with the EU is generally in the range of $5 billion, the 
77 Solingen, p. 80. 
78 Ibid. p. 87. 
79 See Solingen's section on "Liberalizing Coalitions," p. 87. 
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US boasts the largest and, given continuing turmoil in Asia, the most stable markets. 
These businessmen realize the world's global economic highway goes through 
Washington. 
B. THE CASE OF IRAN 
Iran has clearly been demonstrating its desire to pursue economic recovery 
through the liberalization of its economy. Since the end of Rafsanjani's second term as 
president a consensus has begun to develop on what is the best "economic path" for the 
Islamic Republic. Privatization of state-owned companies, a central element of Khatami's 
economic reform plans, is now more widely accepted--even among former conservative 
opponents.80 The new economy and finance minister, Hossein Namazi, is committed to 
the reform program, and has the backing of the central bank governor, Moshen : 
Nourbakhsh.81 Even the new commerce minister, Mohanu:ned Shariatmadari, a 
conservative by reputation, seems ready to accept the inevitability of economic reform. 82 
The MajIis and the government have been conferring on new economic 
contingency plans which have been drawn ul:' to take into account the 25 percent drop in 
oil revenues. The drop in oil prices will cause Iran major problems in paying for 
subsidized goods and providing hard cash for its industries.83 Iran's need for reform is 
made all the more exigent since the fall in oil profits comes at a time when it has to make 
80 "Towards Privatization," Iran Daily, 10 May 1998, p. 3 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
81 Ibid. 
82 "Iran: Outlook for 1997-98," EIU Country reports, The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., 4 September 
1997 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
83 Statement made by the Governor ofIran's Central Bank. Quoted in Middle East Business Weekly, Vol. 
42, No. 21, 22 May 1998, p. 23. 
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foreign debt repayment.s totaling $4 billion to $5 billion over the next year.84 In spite of 
the economic hardship the scheduled repayment will cause, Iran's central bank has stated 
that payments will be made on schedule even if Iran must draw from its $8 billion to 10 
billion in foreign exchange reserves.85 
1. Iran's Economic Isolation 
Iran's "Neither East nor West" ideology made it one ofthe most isolated 
·countries in the world. Khatarni, like his predecessor Rafsanjani, acknowledges that this 
ideology, and many of the foreign policy choices accompanying it, have resulted in an 
Iran that has failed to self-actualize economically since the revolution.86 Furthermore, 
US sanctions and trade embargoes are viewed by many of Khatarni' s liberal economic 
advisors as the primary barriers to Iran's future economic and industrial development.87 
"During the last quarter century the world has developed into a more global 
economy. The formation of global capital markets has created a 
concentration of power capable of influencing national govemment's 
economic policy and, by extension, other policies as well. These markets 
now exercise the accountability functions associated with citizenship. 88 
In today's global economy, economic markets can essentially "vote" a 
government's economic policies up or down and they can force governments to move in 
one direction over another. In addition, this "globalization" has brought with it higher 
84 "New Economic Plans Debated in Majlis," Middle East Business Weekly, 22 May 1998, Vol. 42, No. 21, 
p.23. 
S5 Ibid. 
86 Steve Yetiv, "So What's Behind Iran's Overture to the US?" Christian Science Monitor, 16 January 
1998, p. 19 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
87 The US's 1987 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) requires the President to penalize companies that invest 
more than $20 million a year in the oil and gas operations of Iran or Libya. The US accused Iran and Libya 
of a role in sponsoring terrorism and opposing Middle East peace efforts. 
88 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age o/Globalization (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), p. 40 
50 
levels of trade, direct foreign investment, and economic cooperation. Countries that are 
able to actively participate in the global economic market reap the economic benefits, 
while those forced to the sidelines do not. In the case of Iran, the US has acted as a break 
on many of its economic aspirations-forcing it to the sidelines. 
2. Either East or West-The Obvious Choice 
Iran's pragmatists faced a choice of orienting their foreign policy toward the 
East-Russia and China, or West-toward the EU and the US. Their requirements 
ultimately dictated their direction. 
There are several things ·Iran must acquire through its foreign policy: 
investment to develop its economy; technology, not only for the oil sector, 
but in other industrial areas; and an easing of tension internationally and in 
the region, so that Iran can develop its strategic position between the 
Caspian and the Persian Gulf, and go ahead with plans to build oil 
pipelines from Central Asia.89 . .' 
. { 
Although both China and Russia are both interested in Iran for its strategic 
location and large oil and gas reserves, neither country is capable of meeting Iran's 
requirements for large levels of financing and Western industrial goods. Consequently 
Iran has been forced to mend fences with the EU and, more importantly, make ~autious 
approaches to the US. 
Since the days of Rafsanjani's first five-year plan in 1987, Iran's more liberal 
economic advisors have been calling for bolder political reform to pave the way for 
economic recovery. However, there have always been four-main barriers: the president's 
89 Kijan Khajenpour, comments during a Royal Institute of International Affairs conference, "Iran: 
Looking East or West?" Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 1997 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
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limited authority to make policy independent of the Faqih (the Supreme Leader); strong 
conservative opposition to economic reform; vociferous objections to any rapprochement 
with the West by hard-liners and many conservatives; and a strong distrust ofthe West 
and uncertainty of the US response.90 Although most of these barriers remain (albeit in 
somewhat weaker form) Kh at ami 's tactics are capable of weakening and even defeating 
them if he can overcome, or at least "side-step," the first one-his inability to open an 
"official" dialog with the US. It appears Khatami' s coalition is hoping they can open an 
unofficial dialog which would act as a precursor to full rapprochement and, in the 
meantime, develop fuller trade relationships with other countries and especially U.S. 
companies. 
Khatami's first indication that such a strategy might be possible, and even worth 
consideration, came in August 1997 immediately after his election victory. In a . 
congratulatory message delivered through a Swiss intermediary, the US government 
signaled their desire for better relations with the Islamic Republic.9J Although this was a 
very modest signal it appears to have persuaded the new president that his risk-taking 
could result in some dividends. In response, .Khatami and his allies have stepped up . 
Iran's engagement regionally and globally hoping to take advantage of the benefits 
cooperation offers. 
3. Collateral Benefits Of Regional Cooperation 
What I find most compelling about Solingen's theories of liberalization and 
90 "Iran's Whiff of Liberalization," The Economist, 9 May 1998, p. 43. 
91 Steve Yetiv, "So What's Behind Iran's Overture to the US?" The Christian Science Monitor, 16 January 
1998, p. 19 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
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regional cooperation are the three advantageous consequences of cooperative regional 
postures and the fact that they mirror exactly the goals I believe Iran's pragmatists aspire 
to achieve. The consequences are: 1) accessing foreign markets, capital, investment~, 
and technology; 2) weakening groups and institutions opposed to reform; and 3) freeing 
up resources to carry out reform at home. To illustrate their correlation and significance 
to Iran's foreign policy makers I will address each consequence separately. 
a. Accessing Foreign Markets, Capital, & Investments 
The first consequence is securing access to foreign markets, capital, 
investments, and technology.92 
(1) Iran's Economy-Not What It Could Be. In spite of the fact 
that Iran sits on, and near, a tremendous wealth of natural resources, the US has been able 
to use its influence within the world economy to successfully inhibit Iran's development 
and economic self-actualization. 
While trade contracts have been signed with many countries 
unwilling to support US sanctions, they have not been able to provide the price, quality, 
and expertise .necessa:Y for the development of Iran's important oil industry. As Iran's 
. US-origin infrastructure has continued to age it has been forced to pay higher prices for 
less desirable substitutions.93 Additionally, although some countries have risked 
92 I have listed these consequences in a different order than Solingen did in her study. I identified the 
economic benefit first because I believe is the primary focus of the pragmatists and the main driver for their 
rapprochement efforts toward the US. 
93 See Jahangir Amuzegar's article, "Iran's Economy and the US Sanctions," Middle EasiJoumai, Vol. 51, 
No.2, Spring 1997. 
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challenging the US, others have been much more circumspect with regard to their 
relations with Iran. 
US sanctions have had their greatest impact on Iran's rescheduling 
of short-term loans and overdue debts. As evidence of US domination of the global 
economic market, Iran has been unable to win the favor of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and undergo multilateral negotiations with all of its creditors simultaneously 
under the Paris Club process.94 Instead, Iran has been forced to deal individually with its 
creditors, and had to settle for less favorable loan conditions. 
Iran essentially admitted the need for US help when it granted the 
US oil company, Conoco Inc., the contract to develop its Sirri offshore oil fields in the 
Persian Gulf. This was an event of profound political significance. The $1 billion 
contract was Iran's first agreement with a foreign oil company since the Islamic 
Revolution.95 "That this agreement was reached with a US oil company was not without 
political implications. One explanation is that the Islamic Republic was clearly 
differentiating between oil business and politics.,,96 
(2) So Much Potential-So Little Capital.. Iran has announced that 
it considers foreign involvement to be an important element in reformi~g the economy. 97 
94 Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran',s Economy and th~ US Sanctions," Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No.2, 
Sf,ring 1997, p. 193. 
9 "Sanctions Showdown," Oil and Gas Journal, 13 October 1997, p. 31. 
% Ibid. 
97 Vahe Petrossian, "Now for the Hard Part," Middle East Business Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 11, 13 March 
1998, p. 3. 
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Officials say local industry not only wants foreign funds but also need better management· 
and technology.98 
It is quite conceivable that before the end of the decade, Iranian exports of 
processed metals could double to reach $1 billion. If Iran acquired foreign 
help, however, given its domestic aptitude and the low price of labor, it 
could. take a major leap in exports. The same could be said about Iran's 
nascent auto industry. If political obstacles were surmounted, its 
reasonably priced skilled labor and its large domestic market would make 
Iran an attractive site for foreign investment in these sectors. Iran already 
has in place a vibrant petrochemical industry.99 
(3) Iran'sRegional Economic A.spirations. Iran's pragmatists 
realize Iran's strategic significance goes well beyond its own oil and gas reserves and 
production capabilities. Looking north they see the Central Asian states (CAS) and the 
richest oil fields outside the Persian Gulf, with twice the reserves of the North Sea and 
Alaska combined, and equally huge quantities of natural gas. Iran sees tremendous 
opportunities to apply the considerable expertise of its oil industry in the region. loo 
However, US sanctions and its influence over agencies such as the IMF and World Bank 
(WB) have successfully defeated Iranian ambitions to acquire the technology and 
financial assistance they need to playa more dominant role. Nevertheless, in spite of 
their disappointment at not being able to playa larger role in the development of oil and 
gas resources within the CAS, Iran is aggressively promoting itself as the land bridge 
connecting Central Asia to the outside world. 
98 Ibid. 
99 "Gulf Stability," The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 1996, p. 90. 
100 Ibid., p. 77. 
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Iran is hoping to create an interdependence with the CAS to stimulate its 
. own economy. It wants to become the most significant access the outside 
world has the CAS .... Moreover, this access will go further toward de-
linking the CAS from Russia and tying them closer to Iran, 101 
However, here too the US has acted as an effective blocking force; 
opposing any plan that involves trans-shipment of Caspian oil and gas through Iran to its 
southern ports. Consequently, Iran has embarked on less effective yet more achievable 
plan to link all the CAS through a network of road and railway systems. Iran hopes such 
a network will be the precursor of a pipeline network which would follow a route through 
central Iran to reach the market. Such a network would earn Iran transit revenue and the 
ability dominate, what it hopes will be the region's only outlet. 
In addition to benefiting from the extraction of natural resources, 
Iran has its eye on the tremendous post-independence economic· requirements of the 
region. As Khatarni continues Rafsanjani' s efforts of economic ~econstruction and 
development, the untapped market of the CAS will continue to beckon. In 1990, Iran's 
former Minister of Economy and Finance, Mohsen Nourbakhsh, stated that Iran believes 
the area is a potential market for $8-10 billion in Iranian exports.102 All indications are 
. that this forecast remains accurate. 103 
h. Weakening Of Groups And Institutions Opposed To Reform 
The second consequence of Iran's regional cooperation will be the 
weakening of groups and institutions opposed to reform. Opposition elements are central 
101 Ibid., 79. . 
102 "Iran and Central Asia," Middle East Economic Digest, 15 November 1990,p. 5. 
103 P . 3 etrosslan, p. . 
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to any analysis of Iranian policy and decision making because Iran's political and social 
landscape is dominated by opposing factions and competing power centers. 
There is evidence that Iran's pragmatic coalition has made considerable . 
headway in weakening many groups and individuals opposed to their reform programs. 
The fifth Majlis, elected in March and April 1996, is the first since the revolution not to 
be dominated by a single faction. 104 Although the conservatives still hold a slight 
majority, much of their strength and legitimacy was further eroded when Majlis Speaker 
Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri suffered his embarrassing loss in the 1997 presidential election. 
The primary foundation ofthe hard-line's legitimacy remains its rabid 
opposition to most things Western and all things American. However, over 20 million 
voters in Iran have become tired of the rhetoric and view the hard-line clerics as 
. impediments, ra,ther than defenders, of the Islamic Republic. Although· the hard-line 
clergy and their supporters still represent a politically and socially powerful force, they 
have suffered what may be an irreparable crisis of public confidence. 
In order for Khatami to deliver on the mandate given him by 70 percent of 
Iranian voters, he must take adva,ntageofthe hard-line's weakened legitimacy by seeking. 
converts from their ranks to join his coalition and continuing his steady move toward 
rapprochement with the US. But, wooing conservatives is not an easy task. 
If Iran embarked on negotiations with the US, conservatives are convinced 
that it might force them to give too much. They argue, it would be humiliating if Iran had 
to abandon fundamental issues such as support for Islamic movements. "If we are to 
104 "Iran: Political Background," The Economist Intelligence Unit, 8 April 1998. 
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become what America likes, then what was the need for the revolution?" asked a 
conservative official. 105 Iran's conservatives are particularly horrified at the prospect of 
being forced to recognize Israel, whose destruction many hard-liners still call for. There 
are few issues as emotional to the Islamic regime as the Palestinian question. 106 
Recent events in Iran have highlighted what may be a growing desperation 
among hard-line conservatives fearful of losing what influence they have remaining. 
Their recent attempts to defeat Khatami through a strategy of indirection has underlined 
just how desperate the president's opponents may have become. 
The detention and interrogation of Tehran's mayor, Gholam-Hossein 
Karbaschi, singled out and charged with corruption, from among the legions of corrupt 
officials in Tehran, was an obvious attempt by the hard-liners to indirectly attack 
Khatami. Karbaschi, known a reformist official who orchestrated President Kh at ami , s 
I 
highly successful 1997 presidential campaign, is hugely popular among the pragmatists 
and reform minded in Tehran. Fearing the domestic political risks of directly attacking 
the popular president, the hard-liners attempted to send an unmistakable signal to 
Khatami. They may have felt Karbaschi was the perfect sacrificial lamb. How~ver, 
while it is very likely that Karbaschi has been involved in some level of corruption 
activity-hardly making him unique among even senior government officials-it was 
clear to most observers that he was singled out by the hard-liners for his ties to Khatami's 
camp. Although this strategy may have seemed like a shrewd tactical move by its 
105 "Never the Twain Shall Meet," The Economist, 11 April 1998, p. 33. 
106 Ibid. 
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creators (probably the conservative controlled judiciary), they must have regretted their 
choice of tactics. It soon became obvious that they seriously underestimated the huge 
popular support that existed for the mayor. What they conceived as a plan to weaken 
pragmatism in the government had the opposite effect. 
Instead of reacting in a meek manner such as negotiating and agreeing to 
scale-down reforms, Khatami and his supporters openly challenged the conservatives and 
demanded the mayor's release. Iran's interior minister, Abdollah Nouri, publicly 
expressed "doubts" about the judiciary ministry's "competency," and Culture and Islamic 
Guidance Minister Ayatollah Mohajerani stated he was "shocked and saddened" and that 
no one in the president's cabinet had been informed of the arrest. 1 07 Also coming to the 
defense of Karbaschi was Rafsanjani and his daughter, Faezeh Hashemi, a member of the 
Majlis who charactedzed the judiciary's· behavior as "suspect and arbitrary."I08 
The mayor was finally released (although charges were not dropped) after 
Khatami appealed to Khamenei who subsequently ordered his release. Khamenei's 
intervention on the side of Khatami is yet another example that he is not as far to the right 
as some may believe. Khamenei has shown the ability in the past to "jump to the other 
side" if it serves his interests. However, in this case the symbolism and potential fallout 
for the conservatives is considerable. Khamenei's willingness to contradict his 
conservative "allies" in such a public manner and over such a symbolic issue, may have 
. . 
severe repercussions for one of the last bastions of hard-line power within the cabinet-





the justice ministry. The mayor's arrest and Khamenei's subsequent orders to free him 
may have seriously undercut the authority, and possibly even jeopardized the continued 
service of hard-line Justice Minister Ayatollah Yazdi. 
As if all this was not enough of a blow to the hard-liners, less than a 
month after his release, the mayor was named the secretary-general of Iran's first official 
political party since the 1979 Islamic Revolution,I09 further weakening conservative 
protectionism. llo It was only a year earlier that the hard-liners had 'justified" their 
refusal to permit the licensing of political parties. At that time the director of the office 
charged with approving applications for political parties stated that voters did not have 
much need for political parties because they already had "groups that enjoy public trust, 
such as the clergymen.,,111 
As a result of this discontent, o.ne event that Iran's right-wing clerics will 
watch very closely will be the outcome of this October's national elections for a new 
Assembly of Experts. This body of approximately 80 clerics is popularly elected and has 
the power to choose or remove Iran's supreme leader. I 12 If such an assembly were to be 
109 The ban of political parties currently in effect was enacted in 1981 after almost 100 political 
organizations sprang up in the two years folJowing the revolution. Some of these parties advocated violent 
opposition to the clerical regime of government; specificalJy the Tudeh Party and Mojahedin-e Khalq 
organizations. The 1981 law was intended to ensure that parties and organizations falling outside the 
parameters of article 26, specificalJy that they violated "the basi~ of the Islamic Republic," would not be 
permitted. However, the law as it has been administered has effectively outlawed political parties because 
the institution charged with vetting applications, the Article 10 Commission, has not granted a single permit 
since 1981. For more information see Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, trans. Hamid Algar 
(Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1980), p. 38. . 
110 "Iran Takes Steps Toward Multi-Party Democracy," BBC Word News, On-line edition, 20 May 1998. 
III Akhbar, 21 January 1997. Quoted by Stephen C. Fairbanks, 'Theocracy Versus Democracy: Iran 
Considers Political Parties," The Middle East Journal, Winter 1998, Vol. 5, No.1, p. 28. 
112 "Iran to Choose New Assembly of Experts in October," Washington Post, On-line edition, 10 May 
1998. 
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dominated by liberal clerics it could pose a serious threat, not only to the security of 
individual hard-liners, but to the entire institution of velayat-e-faqih. 
It appears that most conservatives, and perhaps also some hard-liners, are 
awed by Khatami's election victory and continued popularity. This is most apparent 
given the fact that few seem willing to oppose him directly. Their choice is no doubt 
influenced by the fact that their own political survival will be decided in less than two 
. years during the Majlis elections in 2000. Therefore, if Khatami can maintain his 
popularity by delivering on at least some of his promises, it is quite unlikely that the 
Majlis will not oppose him as often as might be expected. 
In spite of the fact that Iran's style of democracy is often derided as 
"illiberal," the strength of the popular vote as a factor in restraining political action in the 
Islamic Republic is very apparent. ll3 H~wever, when examining Iranian clerical political 
system one must also factor in the dyn~cs of public opinion within Iran's Shi' i branch 
of Islam. 
Public opinion is very important in Shiite society. In the Shiite structure, 
the jurisprudent's standing is a function of his popUlarity. He climbs up 
the ladder not just thanks to his knowledge and degrees, but also thanks to 
his popularity and the number of his einulators. Hence Shiite Marja' s 
(Sources of Emulation) are mindful of public. opinion and hesitate a lot 
before taking any stand that runs counter to the people's aspirations. This 
has greatly boosted Khatami and prompted Shiite Marja's to refrain from 
opposing him publicly, not necessarily because they accept him but in 
order to avoid clashing with the people. It should also be borne in mind 
that ordinary citizens are the main source of funding for the Marja' s 
through the alms they pay. 114 . 
113 "Iran: Political Stability," The Economist lnt~lligence Unit, 1 September 1997, p. 42. 
114 Fahmi Howeidi, "How Khatami is Battling his Opponents," Mideast Mirror, 21 April 1998. 
61 
To date ~atami has been remarkably successful in putting a dent in the 
armor of his right-wing opposition. To appreciate this one has only to take a look at who 
has been forced out of government ministries and the political mainstream. Many hard-
liners, including the ministers of intelligence and defense, the commander of the 
Revolutionary Guards, dozens of lower level officials with militant and anti-Western 
leanings, and many more Imam lomehs (Friday prayer leaders) have been replaced with 
members of the president's pragmatic coalition. 
c. Freeing Up Resources To Carry Out Reform At Home 
The last consequence of regional cooperation is the freeing up of resources 
to carry out reform at home. In the case of Iran this refers to reducing the preoccupation 
on exporting the revolution through regional meddling and state sponsorship of terrorism. 
This is an area in which Iran's pragmatists have been laboring for some time. 
Unfortunately, due to their weaker political position and the extreme .sensitivity of these 
ideological symbols, the pragmatists have had a difficult time reorienting Iran's resources 
for more beneficial domestic purposes. However, they have not been without some 
successes. 
(1) Cease-Fire With Iraq. The first area in which the pragmatists 
had an effect was bringing an end to the prolonged war with Iraq. Radical revolutionary 
groups, previously supported by Khorneini, had believed the war must continue until a 
final victory for Iran was achieved because only this outcome would bring a "new Islamic 
era" to the Muslim world. The pragmatists, on the other hand, having resigned 
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themselves by early 1987 that a military defeat of Iraq was unlikely, seized the 
opportunity in July 1988 to finally agree to a cease-fire with Iraq. 
(2) Mending Fences In The Gulf. Iran has also been working hard 
to mend fences in the Middle East and especially on the Arab side of the Gulf. 
Considerable progress has been made since the dark days ofthe Iran-Iraq War, when 
Iran was opposed in the war by most of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. 
Now Iran has diplomatic relations with Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates 
and Saudi Arabia. Khatami is hoping to channel even more of Iran's resources away 
from risky and counterproductive "foreign adventures" of the past, directing them instead 
toward reform efforts at home. 
c. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 
. I 
Today, as Iran struggles to allocate its limited economic resources, there is no 
support among reformers for external conflict-a belief shared by members of the US 
intelligence community. Officials have stated they believe Khatami to be a true reformer 
dedicated to ending his government's support of terrorism and other destabilizi~g foreign 
activities. 115 However, Kha~ami is still far from being able to consolidate his control 
over all structures within Iran. The manner in which the US responds to Iran's signals 
and reforms will be a key factor in whether or not Khatami' s pragmatists can continue to 
deflect conservative opposition and deliver economic reforms to their country. 




v. CONCLUSION-IMPLICATIONS OF US POLICY 
During 1998 the hard-line authorities have continued their indirect challenges to 
Khatami. One of their strategies has been to censor and even close down a number of 
pro-Khatami publications. ill addition to threatening press freedoms, the conservative 
and hard-line opposition has also continued to target the president's political allies. 
Conservatives in the Majlis initiated impeachment proceedings against illterior Minister 
Abdollah Nouri and the pro-Khatami Mayor of Tehran, Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi, was 
convicted of corruption and sentenced to jail. 116 Meanwhile, under siege, Iran's president 
continued to portray himself as the president of all Iranians, rather than a representative 
ora particular reformist faction. But Khatami's greatest hope must.be that he can hold on 
to the critical popular support that made him president and which will be necessary if the 
pragmatics' reforms have any chance at'all. aowever; to'maintain grassroots support the 
president must produce evidence that economic imp~ovements for middle and lower class 
Iranians are on the way. Such a feat may be almost impossible if sanctions remain in 
place and the US continues to discourage international economic assistance. 
The Clin~on administration's May 1998 decision to waiye sanctions against three 
foreign companies doing business in Iran ended months of speculation and was greeted 
by the EU and Iran as a great moral victory.117 However,' in spite of what many had 
hoped would be a step toward the eventual cancellations of all sanctions, US sanctions 
116 "How U.S. Policy Helps Iran's Hard-liners Undermine Khatami," Mideast Mirror, 17 June 1998, 
Section: Iran, Vol. 12, No. 114 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
117 Since late 1997, Washington had been reviewing whether or not the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 
had been violated by Iran's oil deal in September 1997 with France's Total, Russia's Gazprom, and 
Malaysia's Pertonas. 
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remain in effect. Since the US waiver concerns investments which will not produce. 
tangible benefits for several years, there will be no immediate change in Iran's economic 
situation. 
By continuing to use sanctions to squeeze Iran's economy, in an attempt to force 
the country to further alter its foreign and defense policies, the US is contributing to the 
economic pressures on Khatarni' s government. US sanctions and falling oil prices are 
reducing Iran's earning from oil sales to $10 billion this year. This is down from last 
year's estimate of $16 billion. I IS Many domestic development projects and' economic 
reforms will fall victim to Iran's economic austerity and will be shelved or cancelled 
entirely. These survival measures will undoubtedly damage the popularity of the 
president and his reformers, not to mention the impact they will have on discouraging 
conservative fence-sitters from joining the reformers' camp. Moreover, these 
developments benefit the president's conservatives and hard-line opponents who hope a 
failure to deliver tangible economic improvements will discredit reform programs and 
thereby protect their economic and political interests. I 19 
. The position of the US regarding the effectiveness of sanctions is all the more 
remarkable when one observes the effect they have had on Iraq-arguably the most 
heavily sanctioned country in the world. Sanctions have certainly not proved to have any 
appreciable affect on moderating the behavior of Saddam Hussein. In fact, as UN 
weapons inspections continue to attest, sanctions and reduced revenue do not necessarily 
118 Mideast Mirror, 17 June 1998. 
119 Ibid. 
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reduce the capacity of a nation to develop its military arsenal-including medium-range 
missiles and perhaps even nuclear weapons. The sense of being threatened can 
encourage regimes to slash their economic and social programs and become more 
determined than ever to secure what they consider the means necessary to defend 
themselves from their enemies. 
Therefore, the most dangerous thing about present US policy toward the Islamic 
Republic is that it could very well create the conditions which could bring down the 
current government, just as the country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction. If Iran 
is developing these weapons, they would fall into the hands of the hard-liners, leaving the 
US facing a far bigger danger than the one it is trying to avert. 
Ironically, it was US policies toward Iran during the period immediately before 
and after the overthrow of the Shah that brought about the defeat 'of those who were 
inclined to be friendlier toward them and the success of those mor~ hostile. Khatami and 
Iran's pragmatics are repeating history, opening the door to the US wider than anyone 
else since 1979. However, if the US again fails to step across the threshold conservatives 
and hard-liner~ may d~adbolt the door, putting an end the opportunity for rapprochement 




Ahrari, M. E., The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, Washington DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1996. 
Akhbar, "Theocracy Versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties," 21 January 
1997. 
Algar, Hamid, trans., Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Berkeley, CA: Mizan 
Press, 1980. 
Amuzegar, Jahangir, "Iran's Economy and the US Sanctions," Middle East Journal, Vol. 
51, No.2, Spring 1997. 
Banuazizi, Ali, "Iran's Revolutionary Impasse: Political Factionalism and Societal 
Resistance," Middle East Report 24:6, November-December 1994 (LEXIS-
NEXIS). 
BBC News Online, "Iran And Saudi Arabia To Try To Get Closer," World: Middle East, 
28 February 1998. 
____ . "Iran Moves To Tone Down Hajj Demonstrations," World: Southwest Asia, 
1 March.1998. . 
BBC News Service, "EU Warms to Iran," Monday, 23 February 1998. NEXIS-LEXIS. 
____ . "Iranian Officials On·Making Good 'Previously Crude' Foreign Policy," 21 
November 1988, (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
BBC World News, "Iran Takes Steps Toward Multi-Party Democracy," On-line edition, 
20 May 1998. 
Benard, Cheryl and Zalmay Khalilzad, The Government of God: Iran's Islamic Republic, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 
Brodie, Ian, "CIA Confirms Tehran's Role in Bombing of Jewish Targets," The Times, 
12 August 1994 (LEXIS-NEXIS). ' 
Brown, Bess A., "Security Concerns for Central Asian States," in After Empire: The 
Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia, ed. Jed Snyder, Washington DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1995. . 
Cottam, Richard, Ellen Laipson, and Gary Sic~, "Symposium: US Policy Toward Iran: 
From Containment to Relentless Pursuit?" Middle East Policy, September 1995. 
69 
Dallin, Alexander, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1981. 
Daneshkuh, Scheherazade, "Iran Simmers With Discontent," London Financial Times, 13 
August 1994 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., "Iran: Political Stability," 1 September 1997. 
"Iran: Outlook for 1997-98," EIU Country reports; 4 September 1997. 
"Iran: Political Background," 8 April 1998. 
Economist, "Friends and Foes," 18 January 1997. 
"Hate Me, Love My Gas," 4 October 1997. 
"Never the Twain Shall Meet," 11 April 1998. 
"Iran's Whiff of Liberalization," 9 May 1998. 
Fairbanks, Stephen c., ''Theocracy Versus Democracy: Ir~ Considers Political Parties," 
The Middle East Journal, Winter 1998, Vol. 5, No.1.· 
• f 
Farhang, Mansour, "The Iran-Israel Connection," Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter 1989, 
Vol. 11, No.1. 
Faqell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative International Politics, Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1966. . 
Freij, Hanna Yousif, "State Interests vs. The Umma: Iranian Policy in Central Asia," 
The Middle East Journal, Winter 1996, Vol. 50, No.1.' 
Friedrich, Charles and Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 
New York: Praeger, 1956. 
Gottlieb, Thoma~, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism After the Cultural Revolution, R-
1901-NA, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1977. 
Hashim, Ahmed, "The Crisis of the Iranian State," Adelphi, Paper 296, L<;>ndon: Oxford, 
University Press, 1995. 
Hermann, Margret G. ed., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Boston: Allen 
& Unwin, 1987. 
70 
Howeidi, Fahmi, "How Khatami is Battling his Conservative Opponents," Mideast 
Mirror, 21 April 1998. 
Ibrahim, Youssef M., "Divided Iranians Seem Unable to Settle on Firm Policy Course," . 
The New York Times, 10 October 1989. . 
Iran Daily, "Towards Privatization," 10 May 1998. 
___ ----'. "Economic Discontent," 26 May 1998. 
Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. 
___ ----'. and Gasiorowski, Mark J., ed., Neither East Nor West, New York: Yale 
University Press, 1990. 
Khajenpour, Kijan, "Iran: Looking East or West?" Royal Institute of International 
. Affairs, November 1997. 
Khomeini, Rouhollah, Islam and Revolution, trans. Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 
1981. 
Limbert, John W.,"Islamic Republic of Iran," in The Government and Politics of the 
Middle East and North Africa, ed. David E. Long and Bernard Reich, Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1995. . 
Magnus, Ralph, Associate Professor, Lecture on Afghanistan and Central Asia, US Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 5 November 1997. 
____ ,. Lecture on. Iran, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 10 
November 1997. 
Masouod, Tarek, "Misreading Iran," Current History, Vol. 97, January 1998. 
Menashri, David, Iran-A Decade of War and Revolution, New York: Homes & Meier 
Publishers, Inc., 1990. 
Middle East Business Weekly, "New Economic Plans Debated in Majlis," Vol. 42, No. 
21. 10 May 1998. 
____ . Vol. 42, No. 21, 22 May 1998. 
Middle East Economic Digest, "Iran and Central Asia," 15 November 1990. 
71 
Mideast Mirror, "How U.S. Policy Helps Iran's Hard-liners Undermine Khatami," 17 
June 1998, Vol. 12, No. 114 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
____ . "An Iranian Victory the Arabs Envy-and Khatami Will Relish," 19 May 
1998. 
____ . "Interview with Graham Fuller," Vol. II, 1993, No.3. 
Oil and Gas Journal, "Sanctions Showdown," 13 October 1997. 
Petrossian, V ahe, ~'Now for the Hard Part," Middle Easr Business Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 
11, 13 March 1998. 
Plommer, Leslie, "Ayatollah's Legacy is Iranian Isolation," The Guardian, 4 June 1994 
(LEXIS-NEXIS). 
Ramazani, R.K., Ed. Iran's Revolution, the Search for Consensus, Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1990. 
Reuters, "Iran :paper Cautions Against Soft ~ine of Saudi,", 11 June 1992 (LEXIS-
NEXIS). 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, "Iran: Looking East or West?" November 1997 
(LEXIS-NEXIS). 
Salamatian, Ahmad, "La Revelution Iranienne Broye par ses Contradictions" Le Monde 
Diplomatique, 20 June 1993 (LEXIS-NEXIS) . 
. Sariolghalam, Mahmood, Iran and the Arab World, New York: Saint Martin's Press, 
1993. 
Sassen, Saskia, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1995. 
Schahgaldian, Nikola B., Iran and the Postwar Security in the Persian Gulf, Santa 
Monica: RAND,1994. 
Segev, Samuel, The Iranian Triangle, New York: The Free Press, 1988. 
Shirley, Edward, "Iran's Present, Algeria's Fu,ture?" Foreign Affairs, May-June 1995 
(LEXIS-NEXIS). 
72 
Sick, Gary, "The Two faces of Iran; Rafsanjani's Moderation, The Mullah's Holy 
Terror," The Washington Post, 4 April 1993 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
Smith, Jeffrey, "Khatami Wants to End Terrorism, Officials Say," Washington Post, 5 
May 1998. 
Smolansky, Oles M., "Turkish and Iranian Policies in Central Asia," in Central Asia, 
Hafeez Malik, ed. New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1994. 
Solingen, Etel, "Democracy, Economic Reform and Regional Cooperation," Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, Vol. 8, No.1, January 1998. 
Stanglin, Douglas and Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Diplomacy in the Dark," U.S. News & 
World Report, 6 March 1989, Vol. 106 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
Torabi, Bizhan, "Teheran's Chief Spy Keeps A Low Profile After German Arrest 
Warrant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 March 1996 (LEXIS-NEXIS). 
Venter, AI, "Iran Still Exporting Terrorism to Spread Its Islamic Vision," Jane's 
Intelligence Review, Vol. 9; No. II(LEXIS-NEXIS). 
Washington Post, "Iran to Choose New Assembly of Experts in October," 
15 August 1998, On-line edition. 
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, "Gulf Stability," April 1996. 
Wright, Robin and Shaul Bakhash, "The US and Iran: An Offer They Can't Refuse," 
Foreign Policy, No. 108, Fall 1997. 
Wright, Robin, "US Fears Fierce Fight in Iran May Shut Door," Los Angeles Times, On-
line edition, 8 April 1998. . 
Yetiv, Steve, "So What's Behind Iran's Overture to the US?" The Christian Science 
Monitor, 16 January 1998. 
Ziarati, Mohammed, "Iranian National Security Policy," Middle East International, 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
No. of copies 
1. Defense Technical Information Center............ .................. .......... 2 
8527 John L. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvior, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library ............................................................ 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93940-5101 
3. Dr. Glenn E. Robinson, Code NSIRB .......................................... 2 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
4. Terry D. Johnson, Code NS/JO ................................................. 2 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
5. Ahmad Ghoreishi, Code NS/GH ................................................ 1 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
6. ASDIISA-MESA .................................................................. 1 
Room4D765 
Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20301-2400 
7. ASDIISP ........................................................................... 1 
Room4E817 
Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20301-2400 
8. Middle East Division (1-5) .............................................. : ......... 1 
5144 Joint Staff 
Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20318-5144 
75 
9. DIO-MESAT ...................................................................... 1 
DIA, Room 3E200 
Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20340 
10. SAFIIAM........................................................................... 1 
1080 Air Force Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20330 
11. HQ AFIXOPX ..................................................................... 1 
1480 Air Force Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20330-1480 
12. HQ AFOSIIXOQ ....... ~ ........................... : ............................... 2 
500 Duncan Avenue 
Suite 1009 
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-6000 
13. AFOSI Region 2 OL-A ................................................. , ......... 2 
524 Shaw Drive 
Shaw AFB, SC 29152-5029 
14. Mark Roberts ................................................... ..................... 1 
ACI-I00 Room 319 
Federal Aviation Administration 
800 Independence Avenue SW 
Washington, DC 20591 
76 
